<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Golden-Ticket on it-learn.io | IT, Networking &amp; Cybersecurity Blog</title><link>https://blog.it-learn.io/tags/golden-ticket/</link><description>Recent content in Golden-Ticket on it-learn.io | IT, Networking &amp; Cybersecurity Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.it-learn.io/tags/golden-ticket/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Active Directory Persistence: 5 Ways Attackers Stay in Your Domain Forever</title><link>https://blog.it-learn.io/posts/2026-04-27-active-directory-persistence-5-ways-attackers-stay/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://blog.it-learn.io/posts/2026-04-27-active-directory-persistence-5-ways-attackers-stay/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Gaining Domain Admin access is not the end of an attack — it is often the beginning of the persistence phase. Sophisticated threat actors know that initial access can be detected and terminated. Their goal is to establish mechanisms that survive eviction attempts: password resets, account disabling, even partial domain rebuilds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Active Directory offers attackers a rich surface for persistence. The Kerberos architecture, the replication model, the inheritance-based permission system, and the in-memory authentication stack on domain controllers each present opportunities for durable footholds. Understanding these five techniques is essential for anyone responsible for AD security — both to detect active persistence and to assess residual risk after an incident.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Golden Ticket Attack: Forging Kerberos Tickets for Unlimited Domain Access</title><link>https://blog.it-learn.io/posts/2026-04-23-golden-ticket-attack-forging-kerberos-tickets/</link><pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://blog.it-learn.io/posts/2026-04-23-golden-ticket-attack-forging-kerberos-tickets/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;When an attacker extracts the KRBTGT hash from a domain controller, they no longer need credentials, valid accounts, or even network connectivity to the KDC to authenticate as anyone in the domain. They become, effectively, the Kerberos authority itself — able to issue their own tickets for any identity, any group membership, any privilege level, with expiration dates set a decade into the future. This is the Golden Ticket attack.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>